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Abstract
We revisit the contribution of misperceived money to business cycles, and in particular
to the inertial dynamics of ination following a monetary policy shock. We establish three
things. First, the dierence between preliminary and revised money data captures monetary
misperceptions well. Second, misperceived money is quantitatively substantial and also mat-
ters signicantly for economic activity. And third, imperfect information about monetary
aggregates can help the standard NK model exhibit inertial ination dynamics.
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1Introduction
The key element in Lucas' (Lucas, 1977) exible price, monetary business cycle model is the
distinction between perceived and misperceived monetary aggregates. Fluctuations in the supply
of money matter for economic activity only to the extent that they are not perceived. The
Keynesian version of Lucas's model (Fischer, 1977, Gray, 1976, Taylor, 1980) emphasizes a
dierent type of variation in the money supply as a driving force of business cycles, namely
unanticipated changes. With xed nominal prices or wages, even perfectly perceived movements
in the supply of money that dier from those that had been anticipated can induce movements
in aggregate economic activity.
A key macroeconomic debate of the second half of the seventies and most of the eighties evolved
around the relative contribution of anticipated vs unanticipated and perceived vs misperceived
money. The empirical evidence studied in the context of that debate favored the unanticipated
money version. For instance, Barro and Rush, 1980, found that unanticipated money growth
mattered for economic activity (while anticipated did not). Using the dierence between pre-
liminary and revised monetary data to model misperceptions, Barro and Hercowitz, 1981, and
Boschen and Grossman, 1982, found that misperceived money did not matter for the business
cycle.
The sticky price, unanticipated money, Keynesian model of the 70s gradually morphed into the
New Keynesian (NK) model1, which has become the leading monetary model of our days. Like
its predecessor, it relies on unanticipated monetary shocks and sticky prices in order to generate
monetary non-neutrality. But in spite of its general success, this model has a crucial weakness
regarding its implied dynamics of ination following monetary policy shocks. The standard
version cannot generate ination inertia. The extended version (see Christiano et al., 2005) can,
but it relies on pricing assumptions (dynamic indexation) that are not supported by existing
micro evidence.
The primary objective of the present paper is to examine whether the embedding of mispercep-
tions a la Lucas into the NK model can improve its dynamic properties. Recent macroeconomic
work involving imperfect information about aggregate variables suggests that such an endeavor
may represent a promising venue. For instance, Bullard and Eusepi, 2003, and Dellas, 2006
nd that imperfect information and signal extraction can serve as an endogenous mechanism
of macroeconomic persistence2. Mankiw and Reis', 2002, sticky information model as well as
1Christiano et al, 2005, {henceforth CEE{ Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999, Goodfriend and King, 1997,
Woodford, 2003.
2A similar point regarding inertia can be found in a small, related literature that examines the eects of
measurement error (data revisions) on macroeconomic activity in the context of RBC models(Bomm, 2001,
2work based on Sim's, 2003, rational inattention theory also suggest that imperfect information
can be a source of ination inertia. More to the point, Dupor, Kitamura, and Tsuruga, 2006,
show that the addition of sticky information to the standard NK model (what they term the
dual stickiness model) can improve its dynamic behavior. A related point is made by Coibion
and Gorodnichenko, 2008.
A second objective of the paper is to revisit the role of monetary misperceptions for business
cycles, especially in the context of the earlier literature on the relative contribution of anticipated
vs unanticipated and perceived vs misperceived money. This is an issue that has been left
dormant for almost three decades, mostly because the results of the earlier literature seemed to
indicate that misperceived money did not matter.
Using information from the Real Time Data Set of the Philadelphia FED we establish several
points: a) First, misperceived money (constructed as the dierence between the initial release
and subsequent revisions of the money stock) shocks are as large and volatile as unanticipated
money (constructed from VAR innovations) shocks, b) Both shocks matter signicantly for eco-
nomic activity in the pre-1982 (but not3 period, and, c) the presence of monetary misperceptions
enables the standard version of the NK model to exhibit ination inertia. Hence, imperfect in-
formation can serve as an alternative to popular but controversial schemes such as dynamic
indexation or rule of thump agents.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the empirical evidence.
Section 2 presents the model while Section 3 discusses its empirical properties.
1 Misperceived and Unanticipated Money
The early vintage of the imperfect information, rational expectations, exible price models re-
quired that the agents did not observe any of the nominal aggregates. But it was quickly realized
that it strained credibility to assume that monetary aggregates were not observable at all, or,
that they were so but only with substantial time lags. King, 1981, oered a plausible alter-
native, under which information on monetary aggregates was assumed to be readily available
but observations of the current or recent monetary data (the preliminary gures) were ridden
Aruoba, 2008).
3Amato and Swanson, 2001, also use real time date to examine the role of money for economic activity. But
unlike the works referenced above and our work which are concerned with misperceived and unanticipated money
in the spirit of Lucas as well as of the NK model, Amato and Swanson examine the predictive power of perceived
money growth for subsequent economic activity. This represents a rather a-theoretical exercise. Nonetheless, to
the extent that there are nominal wage rigidities and perceived {real time{ money growth contains a signicant
unanticipated component, their test may be interpreted as a test of the eects of unanticipated money shocks.
Interestingly, their main nding of the absence of any signicant eects over the period 1978-1997 is quite similar
to our nding that unanticipated money shocks do not matter over the 1982-2002 period.
3with measurement error. This error was only gradually corrected through subsequent data revi-
sions. Barro and Hercowitz, 1981, and Boschen and Grossman, 1982, tested this interpretation
of the model but were unable to nd any role for data revisions in the monetary transmission
mechanism.
In this section we revisit this issue for the period 1966Q1{2002Q4. The starting period is dictated
by the availability of the real data series constructed by the Philadelphia FED. 2002Q4 is chosen
as the nal period in order to leave room for the computation of subsequent revisions. We work
with both the full sample and two sub{samples: 1966{1982Q3 and4 1982Q4{2002Q4. We rst
examine whether the revisions in monetary aggregates |the dierence between preliminary and
revised data| represent a measurement error. That, it whether they have the properties required
by the imperfect information rational expectations theory in order to represent a legitimate
measure of misperceived money. We nd that these revisions are not predictable on the basis of
macroeconomic information available at the time of the initial release. And that, the hypothesis
of errors in variables cannot be rejected, in particular in the second sub-sample.
We also nd that variation in misperceived money is of the same order of magnitude as that in
unanticipated money. Moreover, variation in both types of money matters for economic activity
in the pre- but not post 1982 periods.
We use the real time data set of the Philadelphia FED5 to compute the measurement error in
successive data releases. In particular, let Mtjt be the initial release of M1 of period t (rst
reported in vintage t+1) and gtjt = logMtjt   logMt 1jt its growth rate. Let Mtjt+i (resp.
gtjt+i = logMtjt+i   logMt 1jt+i) be the revised gure for period t that is available in period
t + i;i > 1. We use t + i = T to represent the \nal" release.6 We dene \unperceived" money
growth in period t as tjT = gtjT   gtjt.
The initial release of money plays a key role in the construction of misperceived money. As the
vintages are collected quarterly, the existence of monthly observations for some variables (such
as the money supply) complicates the identication of the initial release for those variables in
the Real Time Data Set. This is because a vintage contains the data that would have been
available at the vintage date and thus, to the extent that some of the initial monthly numbers
from the previous quarter have already been revised within that quarter, the reported numbers
may not correspond to the initial releases. For example, consider the rate of money growth
4This choice of the splitting point follows standard practice. Nonetheless, we obtained similar results when we
used 1979 as the cut o point.
5The data can be downloaded from http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/real-time-data/.
6All data is seasonally unadjusted. Kavajecz and Collins, 1995, have argued that the nding of Mankiw et
al., 1984, that the Federal Reserve's preliminary estimates of growth rates of the money stock are not unbiased
predictors of the growth rates of nally{revised data may arise from the specic seasonal adjustment procedure
used by the Federal Reserve.
4during the rst quarter. This is dened as the log dierence between the end of March and end
of December gures. These gures are reported in the Q2 vintage. But this release does not
contain the M1 gure initially released in December but rather the M1 number for December that
is available in May (and which is likely to represent a revised version of the initial December
gure). Whether this procedure leads to the underestimation of the degree of misperception
present in real time data or not depends very much on the frequency and timing of economic
decisions as well as the type of data (levels vs growth rates, etc.) used by economic agents.
We know very little about these issues. As a robustness check we have also carried out the
analysis using an alternative way of constructing the initial release growth rate which combines
information from two successive vintages. For instance, in order to construct the initial release of
Q1 money growth, we used the December announcement of M1 reported in the Q1 vintage and
the March announcement reported in the Q2 vintage. These observations are likely to represent
true initial announcements. Nevertheless, this method of constructing the initial release is likely
to overestimate the degree of misperception in real time as it ignores the information that the
agents have acquired during the course of the quarter and which may have been relevant for the
economics decisions made during the quarter. It is encouraging that the results are robust to
the choice of the procedure for computing the initial release.7
Another issue regarding the identication of the misperception from information on the mea-
surement error in real time data money is that much of the dierence between initial releases
and nal data arises from changes in the denition of M1. Such redenitions can contaminate
the computation of misperceptions. Fortunately, as argued by Kavajesz and Collins, 1995, and
Mankiw et al. 1984, this may be of limited concern if the eect of redenition is mainly on levels
and one relies {as they and we do{ on growth rates rather than on levels. Nevertheless, we have
also examined the robustness of the main ndings by using intermediate rather than nal data.
In particular, we have also used t;t+8 in place of t;T. The results are not aected.8
Table 1 reports the properties (standard deviation and autocorrelation) of unperceived money
growth shocks as well as those of unanticipated money shocks, "t. The unanticipated money
shocks have been obtained from a VAR model suggested by CEE and which features output
growth, ination, commodity prices, the federal funds rate and money supply growth, in that
specic order. The monetary shock is identied using a Choleski decomposition of the covariance
matrix of the residuals. The corresponding money supply shock is computed as the change in
7All robustness check are reported in a companion technical appendix available from
http://fabcol.free.fr/index.php?page=research.
8Redenition is not the only problem aicting the measurement of the money stock. \Sweep" programs have
led to a severe underestimation of true (that is, transactions related measure of money) growth rate of M1 in the
second part of the 90s. But because both gtjT and gtjt are aected symmetrically by such practices, it is unlikely
that our measure of misperception is compromised by such programs.
5the money supply that is induced by the shock to the interest rate equation.9 Note that the
unanticipated shocks are computed based on nal data10. In order to gain some idea about
the quantitative signicance of successive revisions of the preliminary data we also report the
properties of tjt+i = gtjt+i   gtjt for i = 1;2;4;8.
Table 1: Properties of misperceived and unanticipated money growth shocks
1966Q1{2002Q4 1966Q1{1982Q3 1982Q4{2002Q4
  (;"t)   (;"t)   (;"t)
t;t+1 0.13 -0.11 0.03 0.10 -0.08 0.11 0.14 -0.12 0.05
t;t+2 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.19 -0.10 0.08 0.20 0.16 0.14
t;t+4 0.33 0.11 -0.03 0.38 0.23 0.04 0.28 -0.11 0.04
t;t+8 0.37 -0.05 0.03 0.38 -0.03 0.04 0.36 -0.09 0.05
t;T 0.45 -0.06 0.06 0.57 -0.05 0.11 0.36 -0.11 0.07
"t 0.35 -0.00 1.00 0.25 0.13 1.00 0.38 -0.03 1.00
Note: ,  and (;"t) are the standard deviation, 1st order autocorrelation and correlation
between unperceived and unanticipated money respectively.
As can be seen the measurement error is substantial. Its standard deviation is higher than that
of unanticipated money in the full sample; more than twice as big in the rst sub{sample; and
about the same in the second sub{sample. Overall the volatility of unanticipated shocks has
increased over time, while that of measurement error has declined.
We view these ndings as establishing that measurement error is quantitatively important. It
remains to show that the measure of misperceived money constructed from this measurement
error corresponds indeed to the concept of monetary misperceptions in the model of Lucas. We
do so by relying on the approach pioneered by Mankiw et al., 1984. First, we establish that the
preliminary announcements of the money stock are best characterized as measured with classical
errors-in-variables. This justies the signal extraction specication employed in the model of the
following section. And second, we show that the dierence between the initial and the revised
announcements cannot be predicted on the basis of information that is available at the time of
9This way of computing the monetary shock is standard. But it would only contain a subset of monetary
shocks if there were also variation in the money supply that was not related to the interest rate rule. Leeper
and Rouch's, 2003, work suggests that this may be the case. Consequently, we have used alternative procedures
for identifying the unanticipated money shock. For instance, we have used a standard VAR containing output
growth, ination, the federal funds rate and money supply growth and computed the unanticipated monetary
shock as the shock to the last equation using a Choleski decomposition of the covariance matrix of the residuals.
Note, though, that to the extent that there are also money demand shocks, the identied shock will be a mixture
of money supply and money demand shocks. Finally, we also considered an AR(1) specication. The results are
robust across all of these specications.
10Croushore and Evans, 2006, show that the use of real time or intermediate vintage data instead of nal data
matters little for the properties of the identied monetary policy shock. In the technical appendix, we report
results for unanticipated money that are based on a series of recursive VARs estimated on real{time data. Our
ndings echo those of Croushore and Evans.
6the initial release.11
Following Mankiw et al., 1984 we deal with the errors{in{variables issue by regressing the initial
release of money growth on a constant term and the nal release
gtjt = 0 + 1gtjT + ut
and testing the joint null hypothesis, Eb 0 = 0 and Eb 1 = 1. The results, as reported in Table
2, indicate that in both subs-samples and, in particular, in the second one, the initial release
indeed corresponds to an errors{in{variables phenomenon.
Table 2: Errors-in-Variables
1966Q1{2000Q4 1966Q1{1982Q3 1982Q4{2000Q4
t;t+4 3.2867 2.6817 0.9207
[0.0402] [0.0761] [0.4025]
t;t+8 4.2642 3.4882 1.1059
[0.0159] [0.0364] [0.3360]
t;T 3.9013 2.8013 1.3492
[0.0224] [0.0681] [0.2654]
Note: The table reports the Fisher statistic for the test 0 = 0 and 1 = 1.
p{values into brackets.
In Table 3, we address the issue of the predictability of these errors by regressing tjT on12 values
of the federal fund rate (R), changes in the stock market (SP) {as in Mankiw et al., 1984, and
Kavajesz and Collins, 1995) as well as output growth and ination that were available at the
time of the release.13 As can be seen from the table, measurement errors cannot be predicted.14
This implies that the conventional measure of misperceived money is appropriate, specially in
the post 1982 period.
We now turn to the question of whether these measurements errors matter for macroeconomic
activity. We have used two alternative methodologies for assessing this issue. One follows
11Note that the existence of predictability would contaminate the conventional measure of misperceived money
with anticipated money and render this variable unsuitable for testing the imperfect information, rational expec-
tations theory of Lucas.
12Note that Table 1 already indicates the absence of autocorrelation and hence predictability based on own
lagged values in tjT. But this is not sucient to establish the lack of predictability as there may be other
variables at the time of the release that could help forecast future unperceived money shocks.
13We have also considered additional variables whose values are available at the time of the release. The results
remain the same.
14Both this and the previous result on errors{in{variables are similar to those reported by Kavajesz and Collins.
But they diers from those in Mankiw et al. as well as in the small subsequent literature that followed the Mankiw
et al. (see, Mork, 1990). Kavajesz and Collins show that non-overlapping observations as well as seasonality
correction problems are responsible for this discrepancy. Note also that there is a related literature on the
properties of other data revisions (such as Faust et al. 2005 who rely on the Mankiw et al. methodology or,
Aruoba, 2008, who uses a somewhat dierent methodology) which nd predictability in revisions, but which,
however, does not examine revisions in money, the key variable in the present paper.
7Table 3: Forecasting regressions
Cst. Rt S&P Y  D.W. R2
1966Q1{2002Q4
0.0802 -1.2338 -0.5514 3.1552 3.6216 2.13 0.01
(0.1151) (6.5292) (0.6417) (5.1810) (8.5491)
0.1058 0.0704 { { { 2.10 0.00
(0.0943) (4.9376)
0.1150 { -0.5339 { { 2.11 0.00
(0.0399) (0.6292)
0.0943 { { 1.9867 { 2.11 0.00
(0.0492) (4.7395)
0.0896 { { { 1.7269 2.10 0.00
(0.0739) (6.2464)
1966Q1{1982Q3
0.1425 -2.1466 -1.0843 6.4376 1.6657 2.10 0.02
(0.2476) (10.0080) (1.2289) (7.8644) (15.6271)
0.2113 -2.7983 { { { 2.09 0.00
(0.1666) (7.5611)
0.1581 { -0.8217 { { 2.07 0.01
(0.0700) (1.1653)
0.1245 { { 5.6539 { 2.10 0.01
(0.0784) (6.5474)
0.2206 { { { -4.5033 2.09 0.00
(0.1795) (11.4200)
1982Q4{2002Q4
0.1283 8.3652 -0.1247 -10.4438 -17.5432 2.15 0.03
(0.1294) (10.1053) (0.6928) (8.2010) (17.9009)
0.0586 0.5166 { { { 2.17 0.00
(0.1183) (7.2883)
0.0689 { -0.0988 { { 2.18 0.00
(0.0443) (0.6696)
0.1252 { { -8.2805 { 2.16 0.01
(0.0688) (7.8037)
0.1073 { { { -6.4111 2.17 0.00
(0.0929) (13.0637)
Note: R =Federal fund rate, S&P = changes in the S&P stock market index, Y =
changes in GDP (Initial Release),  ination rate (GDP Deator, Initial Release). Stan-
dard deviations in parenthesis.
8Table 4: The eects of unperceived and unanticipated money, F{Tests
Output Ination Rate
(p;`) tjT "t (p;`) tjT "t
1966Q1{2002Q4 (3,2) 4.7934 6.8977 (5,7) 3.4001 1.4246
[0.0033] [0.0002] [0.0015] [0.1935]
1966Q1{1982Q3 (3,2) 4.8187 5.9241 (2,1) 0.0949 0.8072
[0.0050] [0.0015] [0.9096] [0.4513]
1982Q4{2002Q4 (3,1) 0.2592 0.1572 (4,8) 2.2657 1.0958
[0.7724] [0.8549] [0.0336] [0.3841]
Note: p{values in brackets (they correspond to the F-test of the signicance of each
type of shock). (p;`) refers to the number of lags of the endogenous variable, p, and
of the monetary shocks, `. tjT is unperceived and "t is the unanticipated money
shock.
Boschen and Grossman, 1982 and involves a regression of the growth rate of output in period t
on its lagged values as well as on unperceived money growth {as well as unanticipated money{
during that and previous periods. The other method relies on a standard VAR approach.
We have estimated equations for HP{ltered output (GDP) and the ination rate (GDP deator)







[it ` + i"t `] + ut (1)
The unanticipated money shocks "t ` have been included in the regressions along side the un-
perceived one15 to allow us to judge the relative importance of the two sources of monetary
non-neutralities: One arising from nominal rigidities (unanticipated shocks), and the other from
informational frictions (unperceived shocks). We test for the signicance of unperceived and
unanticipated shocks using an F{test. The number of lags is selected based on the AIC and SC
information criterion but the results are robust to using dierent lag structures. The results are
reported in Table 19.
The main nding is that both sources of errors matter for economic activity in the full sample
as well as in the rst sub-sample. But they do not seem to matter in the second sub-sample.
Moreover, the size of the eect on output is comparable for the two shocks.
How do our results compare to those in the rational expectations literature? Concerning the
eects of unanticipated money on economic activity our nding is similar to that reported
by Barro and Rush, 1980, and this, in spite of the dierences in the way we compute the
unanticipated money shock. Concerning the eect of misperceived money, our ndings for the
15We have simplied notation by using t = tjT. Consequently, t ` is unperceived money growth during
period t   `.
91966{1982 period dier from those reported by Barro and Hercowitz (B{H), 1980, and Boschen
and Grossman (B{G), 1982. In addition to dierences in the sample periods (1950{1975 for B{H
and 1953{1978 for B{G) as well as the data used (neither B{H nor B{G rely on end of period
values, so there is an averaging problem; moreover, B{H use annual data) this seems to be due
to the fact that we estimate jointly the eects of misperceived and unanticipated money (B{H
only consider the eects of misperceived money while B{H examine the eects of unanticipated
and misperceived shocks separately). When we only consider the eects of misperceived money,
the p-value of the estimated coecient increases from 0.005 to 0.082.
In order to gauge the robustness of these results we have carried out a number of additional
exercises. In particular, we have repeated the analysis using: a) the alternative measure of mis-
perceptions described above (namely, the one that makes use of two successive vintages in order
to compute the growth rate of money for the initial release); b) the measure of unanticipated
money that relies on the four equation VAR and computes the money shock from the error
term to the money equation; b) the measure of unanticipated money that on forecast errors of
money growth in a series of recursive VARs estimated using real{time data; d) the forecasting
regressions (Table 3) in order to lter out the eect of the right hand side variables on the money
revisions. The results are unaected by all these modications.
We have also examined and compared the eects of unanticipated and unperceived money in
the context of standard VAR specications. For unanticipated money we used the two VAR
specications described above. For unperceived money we used the  series described above. In
this case, as unperceived money growth ought to be unexplained by any of the other variables
in the VAR, we estimate a VARX for output growth, CPI ination and the federal fund rate
where t is introduced as an exogenous variable. Standard likelihood ratio tests and information
criteria recommend the use of three lags in the VAR part and the current value and three lags
of the unperceived money growth series.
As can be seen, from Figures 5 and 7 the reaction of output and ination to a shock, whether
unanticipated or misperceived is quite similar. Both output and ination follow a hump shaped
pattern. The eects of misperceived shocks are quantitatively larger.
As can be seen, from Figures 5 and 7 the reaction of output and ination to a shock, whether
unanticipated or misperceived is quite similar. Both output and ination follow a hump shaped
pattern. The eects of misperceived shocks are quantitatively larger.
10Figure 1: Response to an unanticipated shock



















Note: The shaded area depicts the 95% condence intervals obtained from 1000
bootstraps of the VAR.
Figure 2: Response to a misperceived shock


















Note: The shaded area depicts the 95% condence intervals obtained from 1000
bootstraps of the VARX model.
112 The model
The previous section established empirically that both misperceived and unanticipated money
seem to play a signicant role in the monetary transmission mechanism. The objective of this
section is to examine whether the inclusion of misperceived money can help the NK model
exhibit more realistic dynamics of ination in the absence of other popular but controversial
schemes such as myopia (Gali and Gertler, 1999) or backward indexation (Christiano et al.,
2005).
The basic set up is the NK model with price rigidities, augmented to include various real rigidi-
ties. The production side of the economy consists of two sectors: one producing intermediate
goods and the other a nal good. The intermediate good is produced with capital and labor
and the nal good with intermediate goods. The nal good is homogeneous and can be used for
consumption (private and public) and investment purposes.
2.1 Final sector
The nal good, y, is produced by combining intermediate goods, yi i 2 [0;1], by perfectly









where  2 ( 1;1).
The nal good may be used for consumption | private or public | and investment purposes.
2.2 Intermediate goods producers
Each rm i, i 2 (0;1), produces an intermediate good using of capital and labor according to a
Cobb{Douglas production function
yit = at(uitkit)n1 
it with  2 (0;1) (3)
where kit and nit are physical capital and labor used by rm i. at is an exogenous, stationary,
stochastic, technology shock whose properties will be dened later. uit is the rate of capital
utilization.
Intermediate goods producers are monopolistically competitive, and therefore set prices for the
good they produce. Following Calvo, we assume that in each and every period, a rm either
12gets the chance to adjust its price (with probability ) or it does not. If it does not get the
chance, then it sets its price according to
Pit = 
t 1?1 Pit 1 (4)
where  2 (0;1) measures the degree with which prices are anchored to past ination rather
than steady state ination. As a benchmark, we consider two scenarios regarding . In the rst
one, which will be used in the version of the model with the signal extraction formulation, the
price grows with steady state ination until the rm gets a call that allows it to reset its price
optimally. In this case, we have  = 0. The second scenario has these rms index their prices
to the lagged, economy wide rate of ination (as in CEE). Hence  = 1.16 As shown by Collard
and Dellas, 2005, this assumption plays a critical role in allowing the NK model to produce
satisfactory ination dynamics.
For a rm i that sets its price optimally in period t, its price, P?


























where  t is real marginal cost, Pt is the aggregate price index, t is an appropriate discount








t 1+`?1  for  > 1
1  = 0
Since the price setting scheme is independent of any rm specic characteristic, all rms that
reset their prices will choose the same price.
2.3 The Household





















where 0 <  < 1 is a constant discount factor, ct denotes consumption in period t, Mt=Pt is
real balances and ht is the quantity of labor she supplies. Preferences are characterized by habit
persistence governed by the parameter #.
16In the companion technical appendix, we investigate the robustness of our results to intermediate values for
. For suciently high levels of , the response of ination to an unanticipated money shock exhibits a hump.
13In each period, the representative household faces the budget constraint
EtQtBt + Mt + Pt(ct + it + a(ut)kt + t) = Bt 1 + Mt 1 + Ptztutkt + Ptwtht + 
t + t (7)
where Bt is a state contingent claim with corresponding price Qt. Mt is end of period t money
holdings. Pt, the nominal price of goods. ct and it are consumption and investment expenditure
respectively; kt is the amount of physical capital owned by the household and leased to the rms
at the real rental rate zt. Only a fraction ut of the capital stock is utilized in any period, which
involves an increasing and convex cost a(ut). wt is the real wage. t is a lump{sum tax paid to
the government, 
t is a nominal lump{sum transfer received from the monetary authority and
t denotes the prots distributed to the household by the rms.
Capital accumulates according to the law of motion
kt+1 = (it;it 1) + (1   )kt (8)
where  2 [0;1] denotes the rate of depreciation. () captures the existence of investment
adjustment costs in the capital accumulation process (its properties will be discussed later).
2.4 The monetary authorities
We assume that monetary policy is described by a standard interest rate rule (Henderson-
McKibbin-Taylor):
log(Rt) = r log(Rt 1) + (1   r)

log(R) + (log(t)   log(?)) + y(log(yt)   log(y?))

+ "R;t
where the output, y? and ination, ?, targets are the steady state level of output and ination
respectively. "R;t   N (0;2
R) is a monetary policy shock.
We have also considered the case where monetary policy follows an exogenous money supply
rule, with money evolving according to
Mt = exp(t)Mt 1 (9)
where the growth rate of the money supply t is assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic
process.
2.5 The government
The government purchases the domestic nal good using lump sum taxes (gt = t). Government
expenditure, gt, are assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic process whose properties will be
dened later.
143 Parametrization
For comparison purposes, the parametrization of the model relies heavily on CEE, 2005. The
model is parameterized on US quarterly data for the post WWII period. When necessary, the
data are taken from the Federal Reserve Database.17 The parameters are reported in Table 5.
Table 5: Calibration: Benchmark case
Discount factor  0.988
Habit persistence # 0.650
Inverse labor supply elasticity h 1.000
Money demand elasticity m 10.500
Capital elasticity of intermediate output  0.281
Parameter of markup  0.850
Depreciation rate  0.025
Adjustment costs parameter ' 0.650
Probability of price resetting  0.333
Price indexation  0/1
Steady state money supply growth (gross)  1.013
Share of government spending g=y 0.200
Monetary policy, persisence r 0.750
Monetary policy, reaction to ination  1.800
Monetary policy, reaction to output y 0.100









The function S() satises S(1) = S0(1) = 0 and S00(1) = ' > 0. The investment adjustment
cost parameter ' is then chosen so that the model can match the rst order autocorrelation of
output (0.88). This implies ' = 0:650. Note, however, that the same results obtain when we
borrow the value of ' used in CEE (' = 2:5), instead of calibrating it. The capital utilization
function a(ut) satises a(1) = 0, a00(1)=a0(1) = 1=a. We set a = 100.
The parameters of the interest rate rule are r=0.750, y=0.100 and =1.800. The probability
that a rm gets a chance to reoptimize prices is set such that the average length of contracts is
3 quarters. This lies in the middle of the range of values usually found in the literature (See e.g.
Christiano et al., 2005, or Smets and Wouters, 2007).
Two of the three shocks, namely the technology shock, at = log(At=A) and the scal shock,
log(gt) are assumed to follow independent, AR(1) processes with persistence parameters a;g
17URL:http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred/
15respectively and standard deviation of innovations a;g respectively. These values are given
in Table 6. The monetary policy shock is assumed to be iid. The process for government
expenditures was estimated on historical data. a and R were selected so that the model







We now specify the structure of information in the case of a signal extraction problem. We
assume that while the agents may observe individual specic variables (such as their own con-
sumption, technology shock, capital stock and so on) they can only imperfectly estimate the
true aggregate state of the economy. Moreover, we assume that the agents learn gradually about
the true state using the Kalman lter, based on a set of signals on aggregate variables. Without
loss of generality we can assume that some of the aggregate variables may be perfectly observed,
some other may not be observed at all and yet some other may be observed with error. For any





t denotes the true value of the variable,  is a vector of endogenously determined
coecients and t is a vector of noises19 that satises E(t) = 0 for all t; E(t"a;t) = E(t"g;t) =
E(t";t) = 0; and
E(tk) =

 if t = k
0 Otherwise
This specication is consistent with the results reported above regarding the errors-in-variables
properties of the money stock announcements.
Knowledge of the aggregate state of the economy matters for the agents because individual price
setting depends on expectations of future nominal marginal cost and marginal revenue, which
in turn depend on future aggregate prices, wages and so on.
18These volatilities correspond to the the volatility of the cyclical component of output and ination, as obtained
by applying the HP lter.
19Note that the measurement error in any endogenous variable is a function of the noise in this as well as all
other noisy variables. In particular, it is an endogenously determined linear combination of all the noisy processes
present in the model. Consequently, the individual i;t cannot be given a structural interpretation.
16An important principle is that the informational constraints are sensible in terms of location,
timing and amount of noise. Recall that the objective of our paper is to examine the eects of a
monetary policy shock. We cannot allow the true value of this shock to be perfectly observable
as this does away with the signal extraction problem. But we cannot assume either (without
straining credibility) that the agents do not observe monetary aggregates at all (or that they
do so with substantial time lags), a common feature of the early vintage of the exible price,
rational expectations models. Based on the ndings of the previous section we assume that while
information on monetary aggregates is readily available, observations of the current or recent
monetary data (the preliminary gures) are ridden with measurement error.
We assume that the agents receive noisy signals on the variables20, f;;yg, while they perfectly
observe the nominal interest rate, R. In order to capture the process of periodic data revision we
include signals on lagged, along side the signals on the current variables. In particular, we specify
that in period t the agents receive noisy signals ftjt;t 1jt;t 2jt;tjt;t 1jt;t 2jt;ytjt;yt 1jt;yt 2jtg.
We calibrate the noise in the signals of ination, money and output so that the variances of the
{endogenously determined in the model{ measurement error in these variables match those in
the Real Time Data Set.21 In particular, for i = 0;1;2;x = ;;y let 
x;m
t ijt = xt ijt   xt i be
the discrepancy (measurement error) between the perception that agents have in period t about
the value of variable x in period t i and the true value of that variable, xt i, in the model. Let

x;d
t ijt be the discrepancy between the vintage t release of xt ijt and the nal release, xt ijT as
found in the data. We select the values of 2
 in order to match the variances of the vectors m
and d. Table 7 reports the standard deviation of these revisions in the data. Note that in the





Output Growth 0.5419 0.5319 0.5189
Ination 0.2211 0.2335 0.2301
Money Growth 0.4546 0.4367 0.3906
model, the money demand equation imposes a restriction on the relationship of the variances
of revisions in ination and money growth (given R and the noise on output). It turns out
that in the model the two variances are about the same size, while they dier in the data, with
the variance of ination measurement errors being about half the size of that of money growth.
Hence, it is impossible for the model, as it stands, to match both moments. We have opted to
20Note that the choice of the noisy variables is not restrictive. We could add any other variables to the list
without aecting materially the results as long as we satised the requirement that signal extraction remained
meaningful in the model.
21In the case of output, we actually match the volatility of revisions in output growth.
17make things harder for our model by matching the smaller of the measurement error variances
in the data (that of ination) so that the model has on average less noise than real time data22
and imposed the same amount of noise on ination and money growth.
4 The results
The model is log{linearized around its deterministic steady state and then solved. The solution
method for the case in which the agents solve a signal extraction problem is to be found in a
technical appendix available at the authors' web page.
Figure 3 presents the response of ination, output, the nominal and the real interest rate to a
1% shock to the interest rate policy rule under three model specications: (i) The standard,
forward looking, NK model (forward looking); (ii) the version with dynamic indexation (back-
ward looking); and (iii) the forward looking version with signal extraction. In all three cases,
the model includes three real rigidities, namely, habit persistence, variable capital utilization
and investment adjustment costs.23.
As can be seen, the three versions perform comparably with regard to the interest rates but
dier considerably regarding the dynamics of output, and in particular, ination. Namely, the
response of ination. The version with forward looking agents cannot generate ination (or
output) inertia. This nding conrms the well known fact (see Collard and Dellas, 2005) that
price staggering does not suce to produce plausible dynamics. It also demonstrates that real
rigidities alone cannot help the NK model deliver the hump either24. For instance, there is a
widely held view that habit persistence is sucient to generate inertial behavior. As Figure
3 shows (see also Collard and Dellas, 2005) this is not the case. On the other hand, it must
be emphasized that real rigidities are important in order to generate sucient inertia under
either backward indexation or signal extraction. This is illustrated in the technical Appendix
(available at the authors' web pages) which shuts all real rigidities down.
The model with dynamic indexation does generate a hump in ination as does the model with
22As Dellas, 2006, has shown, increasing the noise increases the amount of inertia in the model. Actually, the
exercise here represents a critical departure from Dellas, 2006. Dellas demonstrates that the NK model with a
signal extraction problem may generate persistence in ination and output. But the key question is not whether
such a model can generate ination inertia (this is already hinted in other related work, such as Svensson and
Woodford, 2003) but whether it can do so under plausible informational assumptions. Dellas' example requires a
large amount of noise on all nominal variables, including R.
23Using capital in place of investment adjustment costs makes no dierence for the behavior of the model with
signal extraction.
24Notice that the degree of ination inertia could be increased further by increasing the amount of real rigidities,
by introducing additional, commonly used inertial features such as wage stickiness, expenditure lags and so on.
We have not done so because it would not do aect the main point of this paper.
18Figure 3: IRF to a monetary policy shock












































































Note: Three model specications: a) B.L.: Backward looking, b) F.L.: Forward
looking, c) S.E.: Signal extraction.
19signal extraction. This nding conrms the speculation made in the introduction that imperfect
information could serve as a substitute for dynamic indexation in helping the NK exhibit ination
inertia (a hump) following a monetary policy shock. Note that the former model also generates
greater inertia.
The imperfect information model also exhibits more inertia in output than the model with dy-
namic indexation25. This conrms the importance of signal extraction as an inertial mechanism.
Before concluding this section let us briey report on the role played by price rigidity. Is it
possible that a pure Lucas version of the paper (namely a version with exible prices) could give
rise to similar dynamics? We have found that under exible prices, the model cannot produce
plausible ination dynamics unless one is willing to accept levels of informational frictions (very
large noise on monetary aggregates, including the nominal interest rate) that do not seem
plausible.
5 Conclusions
The introduction of the imperfect information, rational expectations paradigm was followed by
intensive debate regarding the role of misperceived money (the key ingredient of the exible price
version) relative to that of unanticipated money (the key ingredient of the xed price version).
This debate was settled at the time conclusively in favor of the unanticipated money version.
In this paper we have attempted to revisit this issue, both empirically and theoretically. At the
empirical front, we have updated the work of Kavajesz and Collins, 1995 and established that
the dierence between initial and subsequent releases of the money stock seems to correspond
well to the theoretically correct measure of misperceived money. And that misperceptions are
as sizeable {quantitatively{ as unanticipated movements in money, and also have statistically
signicant and similar quantitative eects on economics activity during the full sample as well
as in the pre 1982 period.
At the theoretical front, we have established that adding imperfect information about monetary
shocks to the standard version of the New Keynesian model (that is, to that without dynamic
indexation) allows the model to exhibit ination inertia. Consequently, imperfect information
can serve as a substitute for other schemes (such as dynamic indexation or myopic agents) that
have been introduced in order to improve the dynamic properties of the NK model.
25Adding also nominal wage rigidity would allow the latter model to exhibit a hump, as in CEE, 2005.
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6 NOT-FOR-PUBLICATION APPENDIX
6.1 Robustness Analysis
6.1.1 Using intermediate revisions
Figure 4: Response to a misperceived shock
t;t+8


















Note: The shaded area depicts the 95% condence intervals obtained from 1000
bootstraps of the VARX model.
6.1.2 Using the unforecasteable component of misperceptions
23Table 8: The eects of unperceived and unanticipated money, F{Tests
Output Ination Rate
(p;`) t;t+4 "t (p;`) t;t+4 "t
1966Q1{2002Q4 (5,7) 1.7625 2.3611 (3,8) 4.5848 1.9374
[0.0916] [0.0217] [0.0000] [0.0534]
1966Q1{1982Q3 (2,2) 1.8151 1.2929 (1,8) 2.4231 1.9230
[0.1559] [0.2867] [0.0294] [0.0808]
1982Q4{2002Q4 (3,1) 0.8327 0.0682 (4,8) 2.1174 1.7076
[0.4393] [0.9342] [0.0467] [0.1139]
1966Q1{2002Q4 (5,7) 1.7770 { (3,8) 4.2870 {
[0.0878] [0.0001]
1966Q1{1982Q3 (2,2) 1.8185 { (1,8) 2.0073 {
[0.1545] [0.0612]
1982Q4{2002Q4 (3,1) 1.0347 { (4,8) 1.5380 {
[0.3608] [0.1574]
1966Q1{2002Q4 (5,7) { 2.4132 (3,8) { 1.5319
[0.0187] [0.1439]
1966Q1{1982Q3 (2,2) { 1.2689 (1,8) { 1.4609
[0.2941] [0.1927]
1982Q4{2002Q4 (3,1) { 0.2434 (4,8) { 1.1046
[0.7846] [0.3747]
Note: p{values in brackets (they correspond to the F-test of the signicance of each type of shock). (p;`) refers
to the number of lags of the endogenous variable, p, and of the monetary shocks, `. t is unperceived and "t is
the unanticipated money shock.
Table 9: The eects of unperceived and unanticipated money, F{Tests (VAR-CEE,)
Output Ination Rate
(p;`) t;t+8 "t (p;`) t;t+8 "t
1966Q1{2002Q4 (1,2) 2.3756 7.2442 (5,1) 0.9971 0.6351
[0.0728] [0.0002] [0.3717] [0.5315]
1966Q1{1982Q3 (1,2) 1.6972 4.5005 (2,1) 0.6714 0.9622
[0.1785] [0.0069] [0.5151] [0.3884]
1982Q4{2002Q4 (3,1) 1.8803 0.1242 (4,8) 2.9029 1.6253
[0.1605] [0.8834] [0.0082] [0.1355]
Note: p{values in brackets (they correspond to the F-test of the signicance of each type of shock). (p;`) refers
to the number of lags of the endogenous variable, p, and of the monetary shocks, `. t is unperceived and "t is
the unanticipated money shock.
24Table 10: The eects of unperceived and unanticipated money
Output Ination Rate
(p;`) t;t+8 "t (p;`) t;t+8 "t
1966Q1{2002Q4 (3,2) 1.5034 5.3580 (5,1) 0.3699 0.6260
[0.2167] [0.0016] [0.6915] [0.5363]
1966Q1{1982Q3 (2,2) 1.9133 4.5265 (2,1) 0.6596 0.9915
[0.1386] [0.0067] [0.5211] [0.3775]
1982Q4{2002Q4 (3,1) 0.9801 0.0669 (4,8) 3.4918 1.9805
[0.3807] [0.9353] [0.0023] [0.0636]
(p;`) t;T "t (p;`) t;T "t
1966Q1{2002Q4 (3,2) 5.1373 6.8477 (5,7) 2.9175 1.3708
[0.0022] [0.0003] [0.0053] [0.2166]
1966Q1{1982Q3 (3,2) 4.4059 5.5018 (2,1) 0.0699 0.8144
[0.0079] [0.0024] [0.9325] [0.4482]
1982Q4{2002Q4 (3,1) 0.1810 0.1483 (8,2) 3.1157 0.8265
[0.8348] [0.8625] [0.0336] [0.4850]
Note: p{values in brackets (they correspond to the F-test of the signicance of each type of shock). (p;`) refers
to the number of lags of the endogenous variable, p, and of the monetary shocks, `. t is unperceived and "t is
the unanticipated money shock. t is the residual from the forecasting regressions reported in Table 3
256.2 Alternative VAR representation: Money Supply Shocks
Table 11: Properties of misperceived and unanticipated money growth shocks (VAR)
1966Q1{2002Q4 1966Q1{1982Q3 1982Q4{2002Q4
  (;"t)   (;"t)   (;"t)
t;t+1 0.13 -0.11 0.05 0.10 -0.08 0.08 0.14 -0.12 0.04
t;t+2 0.20 0.06 -0.09 0.19 -0.10 0.08 0.20 0.16 -0.19
t;t+4 0.33 0.11 -0.07 0.38 0.23 -0.01 0.28 -0.11 -0.16
t;t+8 0.37 -0.05 -0.02 0.38 -0.03 -0.04 0.36 -0.09 -0.13
t;T 0.47 -0.06 -0.02 0.57 -0.05 0.05 0.36 -0.11 -0.21
"t 1.02 -0.03 1.00 0.59 -0.05 1.00 1.06 -0.03 1.00
Table 12: The eects of unperceived and unanticipated money, F{Tests (VAR,HP)
Output Ination Rate
(p;`) t;t+8 "t (p;`) t;t+8 "t
1966Q1{2002Q4 (3,2) 1.2918 1.0259 (5,1) 1.0315 1.2083
[0.2800] [0.3834] [0.3594] [0.3020]
1966Q1{1982Q3 (2,2) 3.3839 6.3672 (1,1) 0.6086 1.0103
[0.0247] [0.0009] [0.5476] [0.3705]
1982Q4{2002Q4 (3,1) 1.9844 0.4449 (8,2) 4.2348 1.9693
[0.1455] [0.6427] [0.0092] [0.1293]
(p;`) t;T "t (p;`) t;T "t
1966Q1{2002Q4 (3,2) 2.7596 1.1293 (5,1) 0.6040 1.2035
[0.0448] [0.3397] [0.5482] [0.3035]
1966Q1{1982Q3 (3,2) 2.6330 5.4037 (1,1) 0.0254 0.8974
[0.0598] [0.0026] [0.9750] [0.4133]
1982Q4{2002Q4 (3,1) 0.5065 0.2992 (3,8) 3.0944 1.5677
[0.6049] [0.7424] [0.0052] [0.1522]
Note: p{values in brackets (they correspond to the F-test of the signicance of each type of shock). (p;`) refers
to the number of lags of the endogenous variable, p, and of the monetary shocks, `. t is unperceived and "t is
the unanticipated money shock.
26Figure 5: Response to an unanticipated shock


















Note: The shaded area depicts the 95% condence interval obtained from 1000
bootstraps of the VAR model.
276.3 Use of Successive Vintages in the Computation of the Initial Release
Table 13: Properties of misperceived and unanticipated money growth shocks (VAR)
1966Q1{2002Q4 1966Q1{1982Q3 1982Q4{2002Q4
  (;"t)   (;"t)   (;"t)
t;t+1 0.64 -0.51 0.14 0.92 -0.50 0.13 0.25 -0.57 -0.11
t;t+2 0.65 -0.03 -0.00 0.92 0.01 -0.05 0.26 -0.37 -0.13
t;t+4 0.65 -0.05 0.04 0.92 -0.01 -0.05 0.26 -0.27 -0.12
t;t+8 0.54 -0.11 0.08 0.69 -0.09 0.08 0.39 -0.16 -0.13
t;T 0.64 -0.14 0.09 0.85 -0.14 0.06 0.39 -0.15 -0.06
"t 0.35 -0.00 1.00 0.25 0.13 1.00 0.38 -0.03 1.00
Table 14: Errors-in-Variables
1966Q1{2002Q4 1966Q1{1982Q3 1982Q4{2002Q4
t;t+4 0.1359 0.8628 0.1445
[0.8730] [0.4267] [0.8657]
t;t+8 0.1818 0.2563 0.0468
[0.8340] [0.7747] [0.9543]
t;T 0.0120 0.0684 0.0910
[0.9881] [0.9340] [0.9131]
Figure 6: Response to a misperceived shock
t;T




















Note: The shaded area depicts the 95% condence intervals obtained from 1000
bootstraps of the VARX model.
28Table 15: Forecasting regressions (t;T)
Cst. Rt S&P Y  D.W. R2
1966Q1{2002Q4
0.0365 -3.2451 -1.3176 3.8235 1.8466 2.27 0.02
(0.1568) (8.8939) (0.8741) (7.0573) (11.6453)
0.0462 -2.4740 { { { 2.28 0.00
(0.1290) (6.7568)
0.0219 { -1.2426 { { 2.28 0.01
(0.0544) (0.8574)
-0.0163 { { 3.0679 { 2.27 0.00
(0.0673) (6.4877)
0.0140 { { { -1.0729 2.28 0.00
(0.1012) (8.5536)
1966Q1{1982Q3
-0.1090 -8.7252 -3.2485 10.4133 15.3164 2.23 0.06
(0.3639) (14.7057) (1.8058) (11.5559) (22.9623)
0.0290 -2.2164 { { { 2.28 0.00
(0.2496) (11.3295)
-0.0063 { -2.7988 { { 2.26 0.04
(0.1031) (1.7166)
-0.0475 { { 5.8873 { 2.26 0.01
(0.1178) (9.8320)
-0.0518 { { { 2.5256 2.27 0.00
(0.2690) (17.1161)
1982Q4{2002Q4
0.0904 2.0987 -0.1484 -8.2422 -6.4981 2.29 0.01
(0.1412) (11.0291) (0.7562) (8.9507) (19.5374)
0.0421 -1.5471 { { { 2.29 0.00
(0.1281) (7.8900)
0.0225 { -0.1550 { { 2.29 0.00
(0.0480) (0.7249)
0.0722 { { -7.5534 { 2.28 0.01
(0.0746) (8.4675)
0.0388 { { { -3.1695 2.29 0.00
(0.1007) (14.1626)
Note: R =Federal fund rate, S&P = changes in the S&P stock market index, Y =
changes in GDP,  ination rate (GDP Deator). Standard deviations in parenthesis.
29Table 16: The eects of unperceived and unanticipated money, F{Tests
(p;`) t;T "t (p;`) t;T "t
1966Q1{2002Q4 (5,2) 2.2975 4.1524 (5,1) 0.3044 0.7582
[0.0807] [0.0076] [0.7381] [0.4706]
1966Q1{1982Q3 (2,2) 1.7890 3.3471 (2,1) 0.3134 0.7728
[0.1605] [0.0258] [0.7322] [0.4667]
1982Q4{2002Q4 (3,1) 0.2243 0.1205 (5,3) 1.7119 1.1000
[0.7997] [0.8867] [0.1594] [0.3651]
Note: p{values in brackets (they correspond to the F-test of the signicance of each type of shock). (p;`) refers
to the number of lags of the endogenous variable, p, and of the monetary shocks, `. t is unperceived and "t is
the unanticipated money shock.
306.4 Alternative Measures of Unanticipated Money Shocks
6.4.1 A four equation VAR with exogenous money shocks
Table 17: Properties of misperceived and unanticipated money growth shocks (VAR)
1966Q1{2002Q4 1966Q1{1982Q3 1982Q4{2002Q4
  (;"t)   (;"t)   (;"t)
t;t+1 0.13 -0.11 0.05 0.10 -0.08 0.08 0.14 -0.12 0.04
t;t+2 0.20 0.06 -0.09 0.19 -0.10 0.08 0.20 0.16 -0.19
t;t+4 0.33 0.11 -0.07 0.38 0.23 -0.01 0.28 -0.11 -0.16
t;t+8 0.37 -0.05 -0.02 0.38 -0.03 -0.04 0.36 -0.09 -0.13
t;T 0.47 -0.06 -0.02 0.57 -0.05 0.05 0.36 -0.11 -0.21
"t 1.02 -0.03 1.00 0.59 -0.05 1.00 1.06 -0.03 1.00
Table 18: The eects of unperceived and unanticipated money, F{Tests (VAR,HP)
Output Ination Rate
(p;`) t;t+8 "t (p;`) t;t+8 "t
1966Q1{2002Q4 (3,2) 1.2918 1.0259 (5,1) 1.0315 1.2083
[0.2800] [0.3834] [0.3594] [0.3020]
1966Q1{1982Q3 (2,2) 3.3839 6.3672 (1,1) 0.6086 1.0103
[0.0247] [0.0009] [0.5476] [0.3705]
1982Q4{2002Q4 (3,1) 1.9844 0.4449 (8,2) 4.2348 1.9693
[0.1455] [0.6427] [0.0092] [0.1293]
Note: p{values in brackets (they correspond to the F-test of the signicance of each type of shock). (p;`) refers
to the number of lags of the endogenous variable, p, and of the monetary shocks, `. t is unperceived and "t is
the unanticipated money shock.
6.4.2 A four equation VAR estimated with real time data
In this section, the unanticipated money shock is constructed as follows. We estimate a sequence
of real{time VARs for the output, ination, the federal fund rate and money growth for a sample
running from 1960:Q1 until the quarter of the vintage under consideration. We then use the
data from the last vintage to compute the rst release of money supply growth for the next
quarter. For instance, we estimate the VAR using data released in 1982:Q3 and build the
forecast of money growth for 1982:Q4 using this VAR. We then compute the dierence between
this forecast and the rst release of money growth as reported in the Real Time Data Set to
obtain the unanticipated component.
31Table 19: The eects of unperceived and unanticipated money, F{Tests (VAR,HP)
Output Ination Rate
(p;`) t;T "t (p;`) t;T "t
1966Q1{2002Q4 (3,2) 2.7596 1.1293 (5,1) 0.6040 1.2035
[0.0448] [0.3397] [0.5482] [0.3035]
1966Q1{1982Q3 (3,2) 2.6330 5.4037 (1,1) 0.0254 0.8974
[0.0598] [0.0026] [0.9750] [0.4133]
1982Q4{2002Q4 (3,1) 0.5065 0.2992 (3,8) 3.0944 1.5677
[0.6049] [0.7424] [0.0052] [0.1522]
Note: p{values in brackets (they correspond to the F-test of the signicance of each type of shock). (p;`) refers
to the number of lags of the endogenous variable, p, and of the monetary shocks, `. t is unperceived and "t is
the unanticipated money shock.
Figure 7: Response to an unanticipated shock


















Note: The shaded area depicts the 95% condence intervals obtained from 1000
bootstraps of the VAR.
Table 20: Properties of misperceived and unanticipated money growth shocks (Recursive RT-
VAR)
1966Q1{2002Q4 1966Q1{1982Q3 1982Q4{2002Q4
  (;"t)   (;"t)   (;"t)
t;t+1 0.13 -0.11 0.04 0.10 -0.08 0.15 0.14 -0.12 -0.02
t;t+2 0.20 0.06 0.12 0.19 -0.10 0.08 0.20 0.16 0.16
t;t+4 0.33 0.11 0.00 0.38 0.23 0.10 0.28 -0.11 -0.09
t;t+8 0.37 -0.05 0.09 0.38 -0.03 0.12 0.36 -0.09 0.07
t;T 0.47 -0.06 -0.02 0.57 -0.05 -0.08 0.36 -0.11 0.04
"t 1.39 -0.02 1.00 1.22 -0.17 1.00 1.52 0.06 1.00
32Table 21: The eects of unperceived and unanticipated money, F{Tests (Recursive RT-VAR)
Output Ination Rate
(p;`) t;t+8 "t (p;`) t;t+8 "t
1966Q1{2002Q4 (3,2) 2.4656 1.6888 (5,1) 1.2798 0.2869
[0.0650] [0.1724] [0.2815] [0.7510]
1966Q1{1982Q3 (2,2) 6.1884 5.4264 (1,1) 0.4382 0.3376
[0.0010] [0.0024] [0.6472] [0.7148]
1982Q4{2002Q4 (3,1) 1.5892 0.3339 (6,2) 2.6311 0.2717
[0.2114] [0.7172] [0.0579] [0.8456]
(p;`) t;T "t (p;`) t;T "t
1966Q1{2002Q4 (3,2) 4.9390 2.7609 (5,7) 2.9408 0.3171
[0.0028] [0.0446] [0.0049] [0.9583]
1966Q1{1982Q3 (1,2) 9.7858 8.8322 (1,1) 0.0054 0.4267
[0.0000] [0.0001] [0.9946] [0.6546]
1982Q4{2002Q4 (3,1) 0.2825 0.2384 (6,2) 1.7350 0.1767
[0.7547] [0.7885] [0.1691] [0.9118]
Note: p{values in brackets (they correspond to the F-test of the signicance of each type of shock). (p;`) refers
to the number of lags of the endogenous variable, p, and of the monetary shocks, `. t is unperceived and "t is
the unanticipated money shock.
336.5 Splitting the sample in 1979
Table 22: The eects of unperceived and unanticipated money, F{Tests
Output Ination Rate
(p;`) t;t+8 "t (p;`) t;t+8 "t
1966Q1{2002Q4 (3,2) 2.6082 6.0790 (5,1) 0.9971 0.6351
[0.0543] [0.0007] [0.3717] [0.5315]
1966Q1{1982Q3 (2,2) 3.8031 5.2938 (2,1) 0.6714 0.9622
[0.0153] [0.0029] [0.5151] [0.3884]
1982Q4{2002Q4 (3,1) 1.4962 0.0813 (4,8) 2.9029 1.6253
[0.2314] [0.9220] [0.0082] [0.1355]
(p;`) t;T "t (p;`) t;T "t
1966Q1{2002Q4 (3,2) 4.7934 6.8977 (5,7) 3.4001 1.4246
[0.0033] [0.0002] [0.0015] [0.1935]
1966Q1{1982Q3 (3,2) 4.8187 5.9241 (2,1) 0.0949 0.8072
[0.0050] [0.0015] [0.9096] [0.4513]
1982Q4{2002Q4 (3,1) 0.2592 0.1572 (4,8) 2.2657 1.0958
[0.7724] [0.8549] [0.0336] [0.3841]
Note: p{values in brackets (they correspond to the F-test of the signicance of each type of shock). (p;`) refers
to the number of lags of the endogenous variable, p, and of the monetary shocks, `. t is unperceived and "t is
the unanticipated money shock.
347 Model: Robustness Check
Figure 8: IRF to a monetary Shock: No real rigidities








































































35Figure 9: IRF to a monetary shock and the degree of indexation:  = 0:25








































































36Figure 10: IRF to a monetary shock and the degree of indexation:  = 0:50












































































37Figure 11: IRF to a monetary shock and the degree of indexation:  = 0:75














































































































































Y is a vector of ny control variables, S is a vector of ns signals used by the agents to form
expectations, Xb is a vector of nb predetermined (backward looking) state variables (including
shocks to fundamentals), Xf is a vector of nf forward looking state variables, nally u and v are
two Gaussian white noise processes with variance{covariance matrices uu and vv respectively
and E(uv0) = 0.
Xt+ijt = E(Xt+ijIt) for i > 0 and where It denotes the information set available to the agents
at the beginning of period t. The information set available to the agents consists of i) the
structure of the model and ii) the history of the observable signals they are given in each period:
It = fSt j;j > 0;Mcc;Mcs;Mce;Mss0;Mss1;Msc0;Msc1;Mse1;Me;C0;C1;uu;vvg
Therefore, it is when we specify the signals that we may impose the information structure of
the agents.


















where B0 = M 1
cc Mcs and B1 = M 1










with B = B0 + B1.

















= Msc0Yt+1jt + Msc1Ytjt (15)

















W =  (Mss0   Msc0B)
 1 (Mss1 + Mse1   Msc1B)






From which we get
Xb





t+1jt = (Wfb + WffG)Xb
tjt = WfXb
tjt (18)





































































































































































40where, Wc =  M 1

















with F0 =  Wc
ff
 1Wc
fb and F1 = G   F0.

















with M0 = Wc
bb + Wc


















where S0 = C0
b + C0




















where 0 = B0
b + B0




Filtering: Since our solution involves terms in Xb
tjt, we would like to compute this quantity.
However, the only information we can exploit is a signal St that we described previously. We
therefore use a Kalman lter approach to compute the optimal prediction of Xb
tjt.
In order to recover the Kalman lter, it is a good idea to think in terms of expectation errors.






b St = St   Stjt 1
Note that since St depends on Xb
tjt, only the signal relying on e St = St   S1Xb
tjt can be used to
infer anything on Xb
tjt. Therefore, the policy maker revises its expectations using a linear rule
depending on e Se
t = St   S1Xb
tjt. The ltering equation then writes
Xb
tjt = Xb
tjt 1 + K(e Se
t   e Se
tjt 1) = Xb
tjt 1 + K(S0 b Xb
t + vt)
where K is the lter gain matrix, that we would like to compute.
The rst thing we have to do is to rewrite the system in terms of state{space representation.
Since Stjt 1 = (S0 + S1)Xb
tjt 1, we have





= S0 b Xb
t + S1K(S0 b Xb
t + vt) + vt
= S? b Xb
t + t
where S? = (I + S1K)S0 and t = (I + S1K)vt.














= M0 b Xb
t   M0K(S0 b Xb
t + vt) + M2ut+1
= M? b Xb
t + !t+1
where M? = M0(I   KS0) and !t+1 = M2ut+1   M0Kvt.
We therefore end{up with the following state{space representation
b Xb
t+1 = M? b Xb
t + !t+1 (21)
b St = S? b Xb
t + t (22)
For which the Kalman lter is given by
b Xb
tjt = b Xb
tjt 1 + PS?0(S?PS?0 + ) 1(S? b Xb
t + t)
But since b Xb
tjt is an expectation error, it is not correlated with the information set in t 1, such
that b Xb
tjt 1 = 0. The prediction formula for b Xb
tjt therefore reduces to
b Xb
tjt = PS?0(S?PS?0 + ) 1(S? b Xb
t + t) (23)
42where P solves
P = M?PM?0 + !!
and  = (I + S1K)vv(I + S1K)0 and !! = M0KvvK0M00 + M2uuM20
Note however that the above solution is obtained for a given K matrix that remains to be
computed. We can do that by using the basic equation of the Kalman lter:
Xb
tjt = Xb
tjt 1 + K(e Se
t   e Se
tjt 1)
= Xb
tjt 1 + K(St   S1Xb
tjt   (Stjt 1   S1Xb
tjt 1))
= Xb






tjt = (I + KS1) 1(Xb
tjt 1 + K(St   S0Xb
tjt 1))
= (I + KS1) 1(Xb
tjt 1 + KS1Xb
tjt 1   KS1Xb
tjt 1 + K(St   S0Xb
tjt 1))
= (I + KS1) 1(I + KS1)Xb
tjt 1 + (I + KS1) 1K(St   (S0 + S1)Xb
tjt 1))
= Xb
tjt 1 + (I + KS1) 1K b St
= Xb
tjt 1 + K(I + S1K) 1b St
= Xb
tjt 1 + K(I + S1K) 1(S? b Xb
t + t)
where we made use of the identity (I +KS1) 1K  K(I +S1K) 1. Hence, identifying to (23),
we have
K(I + S1K) 1 = PS?0(S?PS?0 + ) 1









+ vv)(I + S1K)0
i 1
K(I + S1K) 1 = PS00
(I + S1K)0(I + S1K)0 1(S0PS00






P = M?PM?0 + !!
43Remembering that M? = M0(I + KS0) and !! = M0KvvK0M00 + M2uuM20, we have
P = M0(I   KS0)P

M0(I   KS0)
0 + M0KvvK0M00 + M2uuM20
= M0
h
(I   KS0)P(I   S00K0) + KvvK0
i
M00 + M2uuM20
Plugging the denition of K in the latter equation, we obtain
P = M0
h
P   PS00(S0PS00 + vv) 1S0P
i
M00 + M2uuM20 (25)
























tjt 1) + vt) (30)
Xb
t+1jt = (M0 + M1)Xb
tjt (31)
to describe the dynamics of our economy.






= (M0 + M1)Xb
tjt + K(S0(M0Xb
t + M1Xb
tjt + M2ut+1   (M0 + M1)Xb
tjt) + vt+1)
= KS0M0Xb
t + ((I   KS0)M0 + M1)Xb























KS0M0 ((I   KS0)M0 + M1)

and Me =

M2 0
KS0M2 K

and
Yt = My

Xb
t
Xb
tjt

where
My =
 
0
b 1
b

44